To provide a more concrete sense of how far trade liberalization has progressed, Table 1 summarizes annual data compiled by the EBRD for twenty-five post-Communist countries between 1990 and 1998.3 Every year, the EBRD assesses whether a given country has eliminated its state monopoly on foreign trade, substantially reduced barriers to exports or substantially reduced barriers to imports. We consider states that meet all three conditions to have engaged in extensive trade liberalization, those that meet one or two of these conditions to have engaged in some liberalization and those that meet none of these conditions to have engaged in no liberalization. Especially striking is that countries have been engaged in extensive liberalization in almost three-quarters of the cases evaluated here.
Taken More generally, democracy may promote economic reform because constituents are able to monitor and punish government officials who mismanage the economy.7 A free press and the relatively free flow of information about government activities enhance the transparency of foreign economic policies in democracies. Even if public officials disguise protectionist policies, the resulting distortions are likely to degrade a country's macroeconomic performance. There is considerable evidence that this performance influences voters' electoral decisions, thereby limiting the extent to which public officials in democracies can both mismanage the economy for their personal gain and retain office.8 The greater ability of society to monitor and penalize leaders should yield lower trade barriers in democracies than those in other countries.
However, the view that democracy fosters economic liberalization has met with considerable scepticism in certain quarters. One reason is that the institutional factors stimulating commercial openness in democracies also render government officials susceptible to demands by interest groups, including those that benefit from protectionist policies. Non-democratic governments are less vulnerable to such demands and therefore face fewer obstacles to reforming the economy. In addition, democratic rulers tend to have shorter time horizons than their autocratic counterparts, since they must compete in regular, fair elections.9 Because the benefits from trade reform often take some time to materialize and the costs tend to be felt much more quickly, democrats who liberalize commerce run a greater risk of losing office than autocratic leaders. Consequently, autocratic regimes might be more likely to conduct economic reforms than democracies, an argument frequently advanced with reference to East Asia and Latin America.'o Whereas some observers claim that democracy promotes economic reform and others maintain that autocracy facilitates reform, a third position is that no systematic relationship exists between regime type and economic policy. This view accords with the findings of various empirical studies." As Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb point out, 'these findings suggests that the debate should move beyond simple distinctions between authoritarian and democratic regimes to greater differentiation within each category.' 12 Of the numerous ways to distinguish between types of democratic and non-democratic regimes, one factor that has generated particular interest is the extent to which power is concentrated or fragmented within the national government. As we discuss in more detail later, the fragmentation of power is determined by the extent to which a national government includes competing partisan and institutional actors whose agreement is necessary to make policy.'3 These actors include rival branches of government, as well as legislative and executive coalitions involving different political parties. The degree of power fragmentation varies significantly throughout the post-Communist world, in democracies and non-democracies alike. Consider non-democratic governments. Some face constraints from rival political parties or groups, while others do not. To varying degrees, Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Russia and Ukraine have been marked by flawed electoral rules, disrespect for minority rights and widespread corruption during much of the 1990s.14 However, political power has been far less concentrated among elites in these countries than in other non-democracies, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and post-1994 Belarus, where political power largely resides in a small group of elites and policy making is highly centralized.
These However, concentrated power may do more to spur trade liberalization in democratic than non-democratic regimes. By their very nature, democracies furnish societal groups with the ability to influence public policy, since leaders who fail to respond to demands made by influential segments of society are likely to face electoral retribution. Democracies in which power is more highly concentrated vest national officials with greater insulation and autonomy from groups opposing trade liberalization.
In contrast, leaders exercising concentrated power in an autocratic regime are well-placed to seek rents, since few checks exist on their activities. Unless such leaders are primarily interested in promoting social welfare, a highly concentrated autocratic regime is unlikely to engage in commercial reforms. Throughout the post-Communist world, there is particular reason to expect that concentrated power has impeded reforms in non-democracies. In Communist countries, this institutional feature allowed elites favouring autarky to squelch demands from groups favouring openness, an arrangement that provided considerable benefits for incumbents. In some countries, these elites faced few challenges and retained vast power following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Under these conditions, there is little reason to anticipate commercial reform.
In autocracies where power is relatively fragmented, however, there may be a greater prospect of economic liberalization. Anti-Communist elites who gain office may promote openness to weaken their political opponents who support protection."8 Further, fragmentation creates political space for groups with an interest in openness to influence policy outcomes. Financial interests, the service sector and exporters who would benefit from a more open economy had little opportunity to sway policy in the highly concentrated political arena of the Soviet era. Where these groups have gained political clout, there is reason to expect a reduction in trade barriers.
A quick glance at Uzbekistan and Russia suggests that the degree of power concentration in non-democracies may have a potent impact on trade policy in the post-Communist world. Since 1989, elites in Uzbekistan have rebuffed demands from social groups for a greater say in decision making and have maintained the protectionist policies that served them well. After winning the presidency in 1991 in an election deemed unfair by international observers, Islam Karimov extended his term via a 1995 referendum, which passed with over 99 per cent approval.19 As Bruce Pannier states, 'That Karimov is the supreme leader is beyond doubt.'20 Karimov's Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) retains control over parliament as well, largely by banning the nationalist opposition and harassing more moderate parties. One observer notes that 'the hegemonic role of the PDP constrains the political arena for other actors. The continued resort to repression and coercion has ensured that unsanctioned parties do not become serious rivals.'21 Confronting few constraints, Karimov and his allies have maintained protectionist policies. Similarly, other highly concentrated non-democracies in the region -such as Azerbaijan, Belarus after 1994, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan -have also followed protectionist policies.
By contrast, power is much more fragmented within the Russian government. Our analysis also differs from most studies of economic reform in the post-Communist world. For example, although recent research has identified democracy as a potent impetus to economic reform in the region, scant attention has been paid to how institutional variations within non-democracies affect reform programmes.24 As we explained earlier, fragmentation in non-democratic post-Communist countries is also likely to promote commercial liberalization by giving groups with a preference for free trade -including export-oriented firms, the financial sector and politicians bent on weakening protectionist old-regime elites -greater ability to push for policies that will serve their interests. As such, our work departs from the view that highly insulated executives with concentrated power are central to economic liberalization. 
Independent Variables
Our independent variables include each state's regime type, the concentration of power within each state's national government, and the interaction between these factors. First, Democracyi, measures i's regime type in t. This variable is generated using the Polity98 data, a recently updated version of the widely-used Polity III dataset.30 These data measure the competitiveness of the process through which each country' s chief executive is selected, the openness of the process used to select this individual, the extent to which there are institutionalized constraints on the executive, the competitiveness of political participation, and the extent to which binding rules regulate political participation. Relying on a procedure developed by Ted Robert Gurr and his colleagues, we construct an index (REGit) of regime type that ranges from -10 to + 10.31 Larger values of this index correspond 27 The only post-Communist countries excluded from our sample due to the absence of data are Mongolia and Yugoslavia. Note that countries that were a part of the former Soviet Union do not enter our dataset until after their independence in 1992. 28 There are very few cases where countries meet only one of these conditions, which is why we combine such cases with those where countries meet two of these conditions. Note, however, that estimates derived without combining these categories are very similar to the findings reported below. Thirdly, in the preceding section, we argued that the interaction between regime type and power fragmentation is likely to influence trade policy. Consequently, we analyse Democracyi, X Fragmentationit. To provide a rough sense of how the post-Communist countries are coded, Table 2 shows the states that were democratic for at least five years during the period from 1990 to 1998, the states that were not democratic for at least five years during this period, and the average amount of fragmentation in each country over this period. Table 2 , however, should be interpreted cautiously, since many countries in our sample have experienced changes over time in regime type, the degree of fragmentation, or both that are not reflected therein. 35 It should be noted that, based on the sample used in the following analysis, the correlation between Fragmentationi, and Democracyit is only about 0.55. There is also considerable agreement that macroeconomic conditions affect trade policy. We therefore analyse a number of macroeconomic factors in the model of trade reform, data for which are taken from the EBRD.36 Each variable is measured in year t -1 to minimize any possibility of a simultaneity bias stemming from the effects of trade liberalization on a country's economic performance.
Among the most important macroeconomic influences on commercial policy are the level of unemployment and inflation. Trade liberalization redistributes income within countries. Those segments of society that expect to suffer as a result have a clear incentive to oppose commercial reform. Moreover, the losers from trade liberalization are likely to face fewer collective action problems than the winners, thereby enhancing their ability to lobby state leaders.37
During macroeconomic downturns, the distributional costs to the losers from trade reform tend to be especially large, leading these groups to oppose reform with particular vehemence. For example, high levels of unemployment in inefficient sectors of the economy are likely to prompt demands for protection by individuals who are out of work, as well as those who fear that their jobs may be jeopardized by foreign competition. Equally, various studies have pointed out that increased inflation promotes imports, giving rise to demands for protectionism on the part of groups harmed by competition from abroad. To assess the impact of macroeconomic conditions on commercial reform, we analyse Inflationi(t -1), which is the rate of inflation in i from t -1 to t, as well as Unemploymenti(t -1), which is i's unemployment rate in t-1. 44 We also analyse ImportPeni(~ -1), which is i's ratio of imports to gross domestic product (GDP). It is widely argued that rising imports tend to stimulate pressures for protection by import-competing sectors. Alternatively, heightened import penetration may reflect an interest in commercial openness on the part of government officials and may lead societal groups to press for greater liberalization as they come to enjoy goods produced abroad. In addition, we consider the effects on trade policy of GDPi(t -1), which is the real GDP of i in t -1.45 Since economically large countries are usually less dependent on foreign commerce and can often improve their terms of trade by imposing an optimal tariff (or equivalent form of protection), these countries may be less open than smaller counterparts. Alternatively, higher levels of national income are likely to increase the demand for imports and the supply of exports, both of which may lead governments to liberalize trade.
Besides domestic institutions and macroeconomic factors, it is important to account for international influences on trade policy. Since the European Union (EU) has made economic liberalization a precondition for close relations, trade reform may be directly associated with the extent to which post-Communist countries demonstrate an interest in forging tighter links with this institution. Hence, we include EUi(t -1) in the model. This variable equals 0 if i has no formal relationship with the EU in t -1, 1 if i has applied for membership in the EU, 2 if i has signed an interim agreement with the EU, and 3 if i has signed an association agreement with the EU. 45 Data on GDP are expressed in US dollars. The EBRD provides data on nominal GDP for each country included in our sample. We deflate these nominal values using data on inflation provided by the EBRD.
The Statistical Model
To address the effects of the aforementioned independent variables on commercial liberalization in the post-Communist world, we use an ordered probit model.46 The dependent variable in this model is latent: it is a continuum of trade policy outcomes ranging from highly protectionist to very liberal. What we observe, however, is Tradeit, an ordered, nominal measure of trade policy. The ordered probit model maps the latent dependent variable on to the observed variable. To this end, parameter estimates for the independent variables and for two thresholds are generated. The thresholds identify the points where the underlying continuum of trade policy outcomes is divided into the three values of Tradeit (0, 1 and 2) that are observed.47
As we mentioned earlier, our dataset is made up of annual observations for every post-Communist country from 1990 to 1998. Hence, the data are organized as both a set of cross-sections (by year) and time series (by country). Analysing such data poses a number of difficulties, most notably the possibility that the ordered probit standard errors will be incorrect (and too small) due to panel heteroscedasticity or serial correlation. Under these circumstances, tests of statistical significance for the parameter estimates would be biased. In some recent research on the statistical analysis of time-series cross-section data with a binary dependent variable, Nathaniel Beck and his colleagues argue that one solution to this problem is to base significance tests on Huber (robust) standard errors, since they take account of any heteroscedasticity and the grouped nature (by country) of the data.48 Consequently, we use Huber standard errors in all of the following analyses.
We also attempt to address any serial correlation by modelling temporal dependence in the data. Given the very short period of time analysed here and the nature of our dependent variable, the most feasible way to do so is by including a lagged dependent variable (Tradei(t- Having generated some initial estimates of the model, it is important to assess the robustness of our results. We begin by addressing whether our findings hinge on how democracy is measured. Recall that we followed Jaggers and Gurr in coding state i as democratic in year t if it scores 7 or higher on an index (REGi,) ranging from + 10 to -10. Although this operational definition has been used repeatedly, it is obviously somewhat arbitrary and we need to assess whether relaxing it affects our findings. Therefore, we estimate the model after redefining the threshold for democracy as: (a) 6 and higher, (b) 5 and higher, (c) 4 and higher, (d) 3 and higher, (e) 2 and higher, and (f) 1 and higher. We also estimate the model after redefining Democracyi, as REGit. Table 4 reports the coefficients of Democracyit, Fragmentationit, and Democracyit X Fragmentationit based on these analyses. The estimates of the remaining variables are omitted to conserve space. Not surprisingly, as we relax the criteria for what constitutes a democracy and include more states with shakier democratic credentials under this heading (for example, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Croatia), the size of regime type' s impact on commercial openness declines. None-the-less, consistent with our earlier findings, the estimates of Democracyi, and Fragmentationit are always positive, the estimate of Democracyit X Fragmentationit is always negative, and each estimate is statistically significant.55 Equally, the signs and significance levels of the remaining variables are virtually identical, regardless of how Democracyit is measured.
Besides Jaggers and Gurr, Freedom House has compiled data on regime type covering the countries and years analysed here.56 Freedom House assigns each country an annual score from 1 to 7, based on the political rights it grants citizens. To further assess the robustness of our initial results, we follow Freedom House in setting Democracyit equal to 1 if political rights in country i are given a score of 1 or 2 in t, and 0 otherwise. As shown in the last row of Table 4 , the estimates of Democracyi,, Fragmentationit, and Democracyi, X Fragmentationit continue to accord with our previous results. Also, the signs and significance levels of the remaining variables are much the same as the corresponding estimates in column 3.1 of Table 3 .57 Hence, our results do not depend on the measurement of democracy.
The Effects of Individual Countries and Years, Omitted Variables and Missing Data
We also need to determine whether our results are unduly influenced by a particular country or year in the sample. To this end, we remove each country, one at a time, from the sample and then re-estimate our model. Similarly, we re-estimate the model after omitting each year in the sample, one at a time. Except for import penetration, there is not a single case in which the sign of a parameter estimate changes; and there are only two instances (Democracyi, when Belarus is excluded and GDPi(t -1) when 1993 is omitted) in which a 57 The only noteworthy difference is that the estimate of ImportPeni(~ -1) is statistically significant (at the 0.10 level). statistically significant estimate in column 3.2 is no longer significant when these analyses are conducted. Clearly, then, our results are not being driven by any single country or year.
Next, we address whether our results are robust with respect to the inclusion of certain factors omitted from the model. First, we analyse the effects of economic growth, defined as the percentage change in the real per capita GDP of i from t -1 to t. Economic growth may promote trade reform because it both reduces the incentives for interest groups to press for protection and increases domestic demand for goods, including imports.58 Secondly, we examine the influence of government spending on trade policy by including the ratio of i's government spending to GDP in t -1. High levels of government spending cushion the distributional effects stemming from free markets.59 However, governments marked by extensive spending may also have more resources available to intervene in the economy and therefore may be less likely to favour liberalizing foreign trade.60
Thirdly, international financial institutions may have fostered economic reform in the post-Communist world by making reform a precondition for badly-needed loans. Hence, we analyse two dummy variables, one indicating whether country i has a structural adjustment loan from the IMF in t -1 and the other indicating whether i is receiving any (or the largest successor to that party), the less likely a post-Communist country is to engage in commercial liberalization.65 Finally, we analyse whether i was a republic of the Soviet Union. Aslund, Boone and Johnson point out that whether a country was part of the Soviet Union is a proxy for various 'different underlying structural factors, such as the greater reliance on military-industrial production, a longer history of communism, greater reliance on trade within the communist bloc, and membership in the ruble zone when control over money creation disintegrated.'66 In light of their finding that there is a systematic difference in the extent of economic reform between countries that were part of the Soviet Union and other countries in the post-Communist world, we include this variable in our analysis of trade liberalization.
Not only is there reason to expect the factors just discussed to influence trade policy, many of them are likely to be closely linked to the domestic political and economic variables included in our model. As such, we need to ensure that they do not account for the results reported earlier. In fact, there is no evidence of this sort. Introducing these variables in the model one at a time yields a few cases where the parameter estimate of ImportPeni, -1) changes sign, but no instance where the sign or statistical significance of any other parameter differs from that in column 3.2 of Table 3 .
Furthermore, only one of these additional variables has a statistically significant effect on trade policy. As shown in column 3.3 of Table 3 , there is evidence that former Soviet states are more commercially open than other post-Communist countries: the estimate of a dummy variable indicating whether or not i is such a state is positive and significant. Also, when this variable is included, the estimate of ImportPeni(t -1) becomes negative and statistically significant. However, accounting for whether i was part of the Soviet Union has little bearing on the other results in Table 3 and, as discussed below, the strength of this variable's effect on trade policy is quite fragile. 67 We also examine whether trade liberalization is linked to other economic reforms. In a recent study of the post-Communist world, Joel Hellman argues that partial reformsthat is, situations in which some aspects of the economy are reformed while other aspects remain distorted -create rents for certain segments of society.68 These groups have an incentive to press the government to partially reform the economy, but not to fully reform it since doing so would eliminate such rents. The implication of this argument for our analysis is that the absence of liberalization along other economic dimensions might be associated with trade liberalization. Hellman analyses eight facets of economic reform in addition to commercial reform. We include seven of these eight dimensions in our model, one at a time (and exclude one facet -legal reform -for which there is not enough data to generate reliable results).69 In only two cases (enterprise restructuring and competition policy) is another aspect of economic reform significantly associated with trade liberalization. Moreover, there is no case where including another dimension influences the results shown in Table 3 of data on import penetration for the post-Communist countries leads to distortions in the estimated effects of the remaining variables in the model. For every independent variable except ImportPeni(t -1), we are able to obtain reliable data on the bulk (between 175 and 225, depending on the variable) of the 225 observations in our dataset. In the case of ImportPenict -1), by contrast, data are available for only 121 observations, which is why the sample in our earlier analyses is relatively small. In a preliminary effort to determine whether expanding the sample of country-years influences our results, we estimate the model used to derive the findings in column 3.3 after omitting ImportPeni(t -1). Obviously, this tack is not without drawbacks, most notably the possibility that our model will be misspecified after removing import penetration and, consequently, that the parameter estimates of the remaining variables will be biased. None the less, doing so increases the sample size by almost 60 per cent. As shown in column 3.4, most of our results are quite robust with respect to the omission of ImportPeni(t -1). There is no case in which an estimate' s sign changes when the larger sample is analysed. In addition, while the effects of inflation and former Soviet states are no longer statistically significant when ImportPeni~t -1) is dropped, each of the other variables remains significant.
Quantitative Effects
Having established that domestic institutions and macroeconomic conditions influence trade liberalization and that their effects are relatively robust, it is important to assess the quantitative impact of these factors. We begin by analysing the influence of regime type and fragmentation. Table 5 presents the predicted probability that country i engages in extensive trade liberalization (i.e., the probability that Tradeit equals 2) in year t when i is a democracy and when i is not, varying Fragmentationit from 0 to 2. Note that we do not present the predicted probabilities when Fragmentationit equals 3 or 4, since they are virtually identical to the probability of extensive liberalization when it equals 2. To generate these values, we rely on the estimates in column 3.3. Unemployment and relations with the EU are evaluated at their means; GDP, inflation and import penetration are evaluated at their medians, since each of these variables has a rather skewed distribution; and we assume that i was not a part of the Soviet Union.
The results in Table 5 indicate that, regardless of the degree of fragmentation, democracies are almost certain to engage in extensive liberalization. This finding is not surprising since Tradeit equals 2 in roughly 90 per cent of the cases in our sample where i is democratic. By contrast, non-democracies are quite unlikely to liberalize commerce when power is highly concentrated. However, moderately concentrated non-democracies (that is, those where Fragmentationit equals 1) are only about 5 to 10 per cent less likely than democracies to conduct open trade. Non-democracies are equally likely to do so when fragmentation is more extensive (that is, when Fragmentationi, is greater than or equal to 2). Thus, as long as there is some dispersion of power within the government, the odds of trade liberalization depend very little on a country's regime type.
In addition, most of the remaining variables in our model have a quantitatively large, as well as a statistically significant, influence on Tradei,. If, for example, we focus on non-democracies marked by highly concentrated power (i.e., where Fragmentationit equals 0), changing Inflationi( -1) from its median value to the seventy-fifth percentile found in the data yields more than a three-fold increase in the probability of extensive trade liberalization. A similar change in the value of GDP(t,-1 generates more than a four-fold rise in this probability. Furthermore, a one standard deviation rise in the value of either Clearly, our analysis has various limitations. For example, we have focused solely on trade policy. There is good reason to do so, since it is widely regarded as a central facet of economic reform. Further, addressing additional facets of economic reform is beyond the scope of this study and focusing on discrete aspects of economic policy rather than offering a general explanation for economic reform is typical in empirical studies of the post-Communist world.8s Still, it would be useful to determine whether our argument can be applied to other areas of economic reform in future research.
Equally, the regimes in our sample tend to be transitional. As such, caution is warranted in applying our conclusions to analyses of other types of economic reform and to more politically stable settings. Finally, we have argued that on balance previously excluded groups entering politics in the 1990s have had a greater interest in commercial openness than did their Soviet-era predecessors. Our data, however, do not provide direct measures of the preferences of these actors.82 Research on the preferences of social groups entering politics in the post-Communist world would be a valuable addition to the literature on the politics of economic reform.
Despite these limitations, our findings have important implications for the study of trade policy and the politics of economic reform. Over the past few decades, there has been a heated debate over the links between political and economic liberalization. Whereas much of this debate has centred on the effects of regime type, our results suggest that this focus is too narrow. A modest amount of political liberalization -even in non-democraciescan generate a considerable amount of commercial reform. Beyond that, however, additional liberalization -including the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions -has relatively little incremental impact on trade policy. As such, this article demonstrates the value of expanding the range of institutional variation typically addressed in research on both trade policy and economic reform.
